Constitutional Law by Bosik, James E. et al.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 55 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 6 
February 2021 
Constitutional Law 
James E. Bosik 
Margaret N. Dillon 
Bette A. Lingis 
Karen A. Perez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
James E. Bosik, Margaret N. Dillon, Bette A. Lingis & Karen A. Perez, Constitutional Law, 55 Denv. L.J. 437 
(1978). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
The term of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals covered by
this survey was not a particularly fruitful one for breaking new
ground in the area of constitutional law. Few cases of major im-
portance were presented to the court for its consideration. The
more interesting cases presented for review were in the general
areas of employment, prison inmates' rights, guest statutes, so-
cial security, and color of state law. This overview will highlight
some of the more significant aspects of these cases.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT: EMPLOYMENT
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided four cases of
alleged employment discrimination wherein the plaintiffs-
employees claimed that constitutionally protected conduct
prompted their termination or job denial. The Court of Appeals
disagreed, and decided all of the cases in favor of the defendants-
employers.
The disposition of three of the employment cases turned
upon the resolution of two key issues: 1) Whether the conduct in
question was protected under the first amendment and, if so, 2)
whether the protected conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's
termination or job denial. In Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,I the Supreme Court premised the
success of the plaintiff's first amendment claim on the affirma-
tive resolution of both issues.2 In addressing the first issue, the
Court reaffirmed the balancing test prescribed in Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, in
which the teacher's interest in commenting on matters of public
concern was weighed against the school's interest in promoting
429 U.S. 274 (1977). In this case, a school principal circulated to the teachers a
memo relating to teacher dress and appearance. One of the school's untenured teachers
conveyed the substance of the memo to a radio station which announced the adoption of
the dress code as a news item. The teacher was subsequently dismissed. These facts gave
rise to the two questions: What constitutes protected conduct and what role does the
protected conduct play in the subsequent termination?
2 Id. at 284, 287.
3 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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the efficient delivery of public services.4 With regard to the sec-
ond issue, the Mt. Healthy court determined that the causal re-
quirement is satisfied when the plaintiff shows that the protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termina-
tion, i.e., that termination would not have occurred absent the
protected conduct.5 The Tenth Circuit plaintiffs' failure to estab-
lish definitive first amendment violations is attributable to their
failure to meet these Mt. Healthy standards.
In Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 25,1 a
Wyoming school principal alleged that his public disapproval of
school programs and policies triggered his termination. The
school district justified the termination by reference to the princi-
pal's failure to improve the school's serious absenteeism problem
and other instances of unsatisfactory work performance. By
applying the Pickering balancing test, the court found the princi-
pal's expressions of disapproval to be undeserving of first amend-
ment protection.7 The court also found ample factual support for
the termination apart from the allegedly protected expression,'
thereby dismissing the principal's first amendment claim.
Similar issues arose in Franklin v. Atkins.' Franklin was re-
fused a teaching position at the University of Colorado on the
basis of a report prepared by his former employer. Franklin al-
leged that the Colorado regents' reliance on this report was unjus-
tified since the report referred to constitutionally protected con-
duct. 10 In affirming the decision for the regents, the court stressed
I "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Id. at 568 (emphasis added). For further interpretation and dis-
cussion of what constitutes a matter of "public concern," see Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d
928 (7th Cir. 1972) and Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Bertot
v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
5 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
6 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977).
I d. at 985. The statements concerned the internal operation of the school system
and were not matters of general public concern, as stipulated in Pickering. See generally
cases cited note 4, supra.
9 558 F.2d 982, 985 (10th Cir. 1977).
No. 76-1256 (10th Cir., June 20, 1977).
1o The report discussed Franklin's participation in several incidents amounting to
"improper conduct" and served to support a recommendation for Franklin's termination
as a teacher at Stanford University.
VOL. 55
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that Franklin had failed to satisfy the Mt. Healthy standards;
i.e., Franklin demonstrated neither that the conduct described in
the report was constitutionally protected nor that the regents'
consideration of the conduct was the motivating factor in their
decision to turn down his application for employment."
In Butler v. Hamilton," two staff counselors in the Black
Education Program at the University of Colorado were fired after
holding a press conference designed to pressure the university
into investigating the alleged misuse of program funds. The newly
hired program director staunchly opposed the press conference,
and the counselors contended that their exercise of their first
amendment freedoms prompted their dismissals. The program
director alleged that the counselors had consistently failed to
comply with certain directives concerning the discharge of their
employment duties and that the counselors' insistence on holding
the press conference merely represented a culmination of their
insubordinate conduct. In determining that the counselors' poor
work performance and antipathetic attitudes were the chief fac-
tors motivating the terminations, the court noted that the exer-
cise of a constitutionally protected right does not absolve the
employee of responsibility for prior transgressions committed
during the course of employment.' 3
The court's strict application in these cases of the Pickering
balancing test and the Mt. Healthy standards reveals the court's
underlying interest in preventing employees from claiming the
exercise of first amendment rights as a blanket defense against
termination or job denial. The Pickering test may be used to
exclude from first amendment protection an employee's commen-
tary relating to the internal affairs of the employing organization
and the Mt. Healthy causal requirement insures that exercise of
first amendment rights does not excuse substandard work per-
formance. '1 The latter requirement is especially pertinent in cases
" No. 76-1256 at 7.
12 542 F.2d 835 (10th Cir, 1976).
*' Id. at 839.
" "A discharge for exercise of first amendment rights is impermissible .... The
exercise of a first amendment right, however, does not insulate a public employee from
being discharged for occurrences prior to the exercise of the right. Furthermore, the exer-
cise of a constitutional right does not provide a grace period for a public employee immu-
nizing him from discharge immediately following such exercise, as long as the exercise of
1978
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such as Schmidt and Butler where several disparate factors cul-
minated in the plaintiff's termination.
In United States v. City of Albuquerque,'5 the court consid-
ered the dismissal of a Seventh Day Adventist for his refusal to
work on Saturday.'6 The 1964 Civil Rights Act protects employees
from discriminatory dismissal on religious grounds 7 and requires
the employer to "reasonably accommodate" an employee's reli-
gious practice unless such accommodation would pose an "undue
hardship" on his business. 8 The trial court found that the em-
ployer had a liberal policy governing time off and that the plain-
tiff had taken little initiative in attempting to trade shifts with
other workers so as to avoid Saturday work. The appellate court,
in affirming that the employer had acted reasonably, stressed
that "reasonably accommodate" and "undue hardship" are rela-
tive terms whose meanings must be interpreted within the frame-
work of particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
case,'9 and that such determinations are essentially findings of
fact.20 Since from the record none of these findings were clearly
erroneous, the appellate court was obliged to uphold the trial
court's decision .21
II. DUE PROCESS: EMPLOYMENT
In Staton v. Mayers,22 the plaintiff claimed that his right to
due process was violated by the inadequacy of the notice of his
hearing and by the bias of the hearing tribunal in his dismissal
as superintendent of a school district in Oklahoma on grounds of
willful neglect of duty and incompetence. The threshold question
before the court was whether Staton's dismissal burdened a lib-
erty or property interest so that his right to due process was in
issue. The court held that Staton was protected by due process
the right did not motivate the dismissal." Butler v. Hamilton, 542 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir.
1976).
'5 545 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1976).
The plaintiff was a fireman whose schedule frequently included Saturday work.
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
" 545 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1976). See Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529
F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
545 F.2d 110, 115.
22 The court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and on Williams v. Southern Union Gas
Co. in support of its reluctance to overturn the trial court's findings.
- 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).
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because he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to his job de-
rived from his contract with the school district which was in effect
at the time of his dismissal, 3 and because he was deprived of
liberty and property by the stigma of being branded incompetent
and guilty of willful neglect of duty. 4
Staton claimed that the notice of his hearing was inadequate
because it did not specify the act or deficiencies considered by the
board to amount to willful neglect of duty or incompetence; nor
did it specify any of the adverse witnesses. The Tenth Circuit
held that the undetailed charges were insufficient to constitute
meaningful notice," but that, since Staton failed to make a
timely objection, his belated claim of insufficiency did not dem-
onstrate a denial of due process .
2
Staton further claimed that the three members of the school
board who voted for his dismissal had made public statements
against him, showing a biased tribunal. After a lengthy analysis
of the background and system of school administration involved,
the Tenth Circuit held that the tribunal did not meet due process
demands for a fair hearing with the appearance of fairness.Y At
the time Staton was dismissed there were no procedures available
for providing an alternate tribunal, but subsequent to his dis-
missal, the Oklahoma legislature provided for appeal remedies
including a full hearing and review on the facts by a special
commission and further appeal to the State Board of Education.
In setting aside Staton's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit noted that
if the board should renew its decision to dismiss Staton, he could
then use the new appeal remedies to challenge the fairness of the
tribunal .28
" Id. at 911. For this decision, the court cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court stated: "To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have . . . a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."
" 552 F.2d at 911. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of governmental action, procedural due process insures that person fair
procedures. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Powers v.
Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 539 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 552 F.2d at 912. The minimum requirements of procedural due process are notice
and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before deprivation
of the liberty or property interests of the plaintiff. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
579, 581 (1975) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 576 n.15 (1972)).
" 552 F.2d at 912.
" Id. at 914.
" Id. at 915.
1978
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In Schultz v. Parsons,9 the Tenth Circuit held that a valid
expectation of continued employment does not arise until a
teacher has tenure and, therefore, the plaintiff's right to due pro-
cess was not violated when the school district informed him that
his teaching contract would not be renewed without giving him
an opportunity for a hearing.30
Schultz filed a civil rights action against the Denver Public
School System alleging that his public criticism of the school
system's curriculum was the basis upon which the defendants
changed his positive evaluation to a negative "do not rehire"
evaluation which resulted in the nonrenewal of his contract.
Schultz contended that this change in his evaluation was retalia-
tory and violative of his first amendment rights of freedom of
expression and speech as well as violative of his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law.
The trial court held Schultz's due process claims to be with-
out merit and dismissed the cause of action."' On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that Schultz did
not have a property right in his employment since he did not have
tenure,32 and, therefore, his contract nonrenewal need not be pre-
ceded by a hearing since it was not predicated on his character. 3
a No. 76-1389 (10th Cir. July 18, 1977).
" Id. at 6.
n Id. at 4.
" Id. at 6. Since there is no federal constitutional right to public employment, the
issue of whether a teacher has a property right within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment must be determined by the law of the state where the teacher is employed.
Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 369 F. Supp. 648, 649 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d
38 (10th Cir. 1976). According to the court, a nontenured teacher does not have a property
right in his employment unless a legitimate objective expectancy of continued employ-
ment is reasonable, based upon implied agreements or statutory or administrative proce-
dures governing nonrenewal of contracts. Weathers v. West Yuma Cty. School Dist. R-J-
1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1976).
' While recognizing that any reason assigned for dismissal of a teacher is likely to
negatively reflect on his character, the court, in Schultz, held that only a dismissal "which
assumes a constitutional magnitude is one which carries a stigma that seriously damages
the individual's ability to obtain other employment opportunities." No. 76-1389 at 7.
Using this test for determining whether a hearing was required prior to nonrenewal of
Schultz's contract, the court determined that no such stigma attached in Schultz's case
and that the issue was settled by Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) wherein
the Supreme Court stated that due process would accord an opportunity to refute charges
where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake. Id. at 573, quoted
at No. 76-1389 at 7.
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In regard to Schultz's first amendment claim, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that because he did not have tenure, he had the burden
of proving he was not rehired for constitutionally impermissible
reasons, and that he had failed to meet this burden. 3
III. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS: MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE
In Ousdahl v. Sanders,35 plaintiffs employment as a Law-
rence, Kansas fireman was terminated pursuant to a city ordi-
nance requiring the policemen and firemen of the city to maintain
their residence within Lawrence city limits. Those who failed to
do so would be discharged.
Ousdahl challenged the ordinance as being unconstitutional
on three grounds: 1) "[I]t denies him the right to live where he
chooses, presumably limiting his right to travel and associate,
and yet maintain his employment;" 31 2) it denies him equal pro-
tection; and 3) it denies him due process. The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas held that the ordinance
was constitutional. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Citing McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service
Commission,3" the court stated that no constitutional right exists
to allow one to continue living outside a city while maintaining
employment with the city. Ousdahl could live outside the city
limits-he was simply precluded from working for the Lawrence
police or fire department if he chose to do so.
Having concluded that no fundamental constitutional right
was involved,38 the court turned to an examination of the
"rational relationship" test to determine whether Ousdahl's
equal protection rights had been violated. The ordinance itself
stated two city interests which the ordinance was supposed to
further: improved community relations between the policemen
and firemen and the citizens of Lawrence, and greater protection
for the public in case of emergency. The court held that the ordi-
u No. 76-1389 at 4-5.
No. 76-2111 (10th Cir. July 13, 1977).
N No. 76-2111 at 3.
424 U.S. 645 (1976).
U Therefore, the "compelling governmental interest" test did not have to be satisfied.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
" E.g. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
1978
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nance's residency requirement bore a rational connection to these
legitimate city interests, and thus, the equal protection test was
satisfied.
The court held that Ousdahl had failed to establish a cogniz-
able liberty or property interest in his employment. The city com-
mission could fire him at will, and Ousdahl's claim amounted to
nothing more than a "unilateral expectancy of continued employ-
ment."4 0 Thus, under the principles of Board of Regents v. Roth,"
and Perry v. Sindermann,2 no pre-termination right to notice and
hearing existed.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT: PRISON INMATES
In Green v. Director, Colorado State Department of
Corrections,43 a prisoner, incarcerated in the Missouri State Peni-
tentiary serving a Missouri sentence, requested that he be trans-
ferred to the Colorado State Penitentiary, presumably to be near
his relatives and to prepare himself for post-release residency in
Colorado. The Colorado authorities refused to accept the transfer.
Green claimed in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that his
transfer was denied due to his exercise of his rights of free speech,
of freedom of religion," and of freedom to petition the government
for redress of grievances.45 His action was dismissed by the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.
The court held that "[n]on-transfer of a prisoner under a
discretionary provision of the Interstate Correction Compact does
not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the appellant.""
Green could continue to exercise at the Missouri State Peniten-
tiary all the rights which one possesses by virtue of the Constitu-
tion. There is no additional constitutional right to have granted
" No. 76-2111 at 5.
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of lib-
erty and property." Id. at 569.
42 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
, No. 76-2014 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1977).
" Green was "assertedly also a minister of the Human Awareness Universal Life
Church, basic tenets of which include, in his view, that prisoners are special Christians
and support for a policy of conjugal visits for prisoners." No. 76-2014 at 2.
" Green was cited as "a notorious and prolific jailhouse lawyer." Id.
a Id. at 3.
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a requested transfer to the penal institution of another state. The
dismissal of the action was thus proper. The court distinguished
those cases wherein prison authorities affirmatively take actions
which raise questions of constitutional magnitude, for example,
the imposition of solitary confinement, 7 or the unrequested
transfer to another state.48
The Tenth Circuit saw the case of Kennedy v. Meachem49 as
raising some fundamental constitutional questions. Weldon M.
Kennedy, Richard B. Reeder, and Robert R. Collingwood were
inmates of the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The three were fol-
lowers of Satanism. They brought this civil rights action, alleging
that the defendant prison authorities had violated the plaintiffs'
first amendment rights by restricting the practice of their reli-
gion.5 ° The United States District Court for the District of Wyo-
ming dismissed the complaint." Plaintiffs appealed." The Tenth
Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and remanded the
cause for further proceedings."
At issue was whether the dismissal was proper. The defen-
dants argued in favor of its propriety, claiming that the complaint
failed to establish that Satanism is a religion and thus no first
amendment protection was due, and that, in any case, there were
reasonable restrictions on the practice of Satanism only, with no
restriction on the plaintiffs' belief in it.
The court first pointed out that the lower court had not held
that Satanism was not a religion. Rather, it had concluded from
its analysis of the complaint that there were reasonable restric-
tions on the practice of Satanism, "apparently either accepting
'1 E.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner alleged that he was put
in solitary confinement as a penalty for sharing his religious materials with other inmates).
" E.g., Fajariak v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974) (Black Muslim and Chris-
tian Scientist prisoners alleged that their transfers resulted from their religious activities).
" 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976).
The allegations included denial of plaintiffs' right to have certain ritual items in
their cells; prohibition of plaintiffs' posting of religious information; refusal of plaintiffs'
request to have a religious study group; discrimination against Satanist inmates in assign-
ment of employment; and general harassment of plaintiffs. Id. at 1059.
" 382 F. Supp. 996 (D. Wyo. 1974).
" The district court had granted defendants' motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
but had ordered dismissal of the case after denying defendant's motions for appointment
of counsel and disqualification of the presiding district judge. Defendants appealed all
three rulings. 540 F.2d at 1059.
" Id. at 1062.
1978
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the allegations that for constitutional purposes a religion was
involved, or reasoning that even assuming that a religion was
involved the restrictions were permissible."
The Tenth Circuit admonished that the dismissal of the case,
without a responsive pleading or an evidentiary hearing, pre-
cluded any attempts by the parties to prove that Satanism is or
is not a religion within the meaning of the first amendment.
55
The court acknowledged that the practice of one's religion is
subject to certain restrictions," and that the fact that these plain-
tiffs were prison inmates bore consideration, in that "[wihile in
custody inmates have only such rights in practice of their religion
as can be exercised without impairing requirements of prison dis-
cipline."57 But the court pointed out that the dismissal precluded
any arguments that the restrictions imposed by the defendants
were or were not "taken as necessary security or control measures
in the prison."58
The Tenth Circuit, in remanding the case, instructed the
lower court on the balancing test it would be required to apply if
it found on remand that a religion was involved and that restric-
tions on the exercise of such religion were being imposed. The
district court would have to "determine whether any incidental
burden on fundamental First Amendment rights is justified by a
compelling state interest in the regulation of prison affairs, within
the State's constitutional power.
'59
The court in Kennedy was properly responsive to the claims
of the inmates. There is no inconsistency in its treatment of
Green's case, the realization being clearly expressed in Green that
" Id. at 1060.
5 The court pointed out that the plaintiffs might be able to prove that Satanism is
entitled to first amendment protection, citing Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974), (upheld a finding that the Church of the New
Song was a religion within the meaning of the first amendment) and United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), (discussed the "I Am" movement in terms of the first amend-
ment).
" See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
540 F.2d at 1061. See Long v. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 262, 270 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd,
473 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1973).
540 F.2d at 1061.
, Id. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456
F.2d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 1972); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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prisoners as well as other persons possess constitutional rights,
and whether such rights exist depends on the factual setting of
the case."
V. EQUAL PROTECTION: GUEST STATUTE
In Neu v. Grant,"' a gratuitous passenger in an automobile
which was involved in an accident was injured and brought suit
for damages against the operator of the vehicle in which she was
traveling. The jury verdict and judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming denied her recovery.
Neu appealed.
Neu attacked the instruction given by the lower court to the
jury that she was a guest in the automobile in which she was
traveling, and therefore, under the Wyoming guest statute,"2 she
had the burden of proving that the operator of said vehicle was
grossly negligent. Neu challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, mainly on the ground that it denied her equal protec-
tion, 3 guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 4 and the Wyoming
Constitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and
judgment.66
The main obstacle to a successful argument by Neu was the
decision in Silver v. Silver,7 wherein the United States Supreme
Court upheld, against an equal protection challenge, the Con-
necticut guest statute which required a showing by the guest that
the operator of the automobile intentionally caused the accident
" No. 76-2014 (10th Cir., Apr. 26, 1977).
548 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1977).
2 WYO.. STAT. § 31-5-1116 (1977).
Neu's case was also based on due process grounds in that the statute "deprives
[her] of any opportunity to recover damages for her personal injuries from those responsi-
ble for their infliction, which does not lend any reasonable furtherance of any object
protective of the public welfare . 548 F.2d at 283. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV;
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Neu also claimed that "by effectively denying [her] recovery of money damages, she
is barred from the 'courthouse door'. 548 F.2d at 283. See Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 8;
WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
The above claims were not specifically discussed by the Tenth Circuit.
"4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 34; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 27.
" Also dealt with in this decision was whether Neu had adequately preserved for
appellate consideration her objections to the statute. The court's analysis of this issue is
not within the scope of this note.
- 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
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or operated the automobile with reckless disregard for the rights
of other persons. The court in Silver focused on the argument that
the statute created an unconstitutional distinction between gra-
tuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other kinds of
vehicles, rather than an attack based on the distinction between
gratuitous passengers and those who pay. The conclusion was
that, "It is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil
where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most fre-
quently occurs."69
Neu argued that Silver should be cast aside.70 There was
indeed substantial authority for her plea.7 On the other hand,
there was a good deal of case law on the other side,72 and the court
in Neu pointed out that the United States Supreme Court had
summarily dismissed an appeal involving an equal protection
attack on the constitutionality of the Utah guest statute as not
presenting a substantial federal question,7 3 such decision consti-
tuting an adjudication on the merits, binding on state and lower
federal courts."
The court proceeded to discuss the United States Supreme
Court's reaffirmance of Silver in Sidle v. Majors,75 although the
0 This was not made clear in the Neu opinion. See 548 F.2d at 284; Brown v. Merlo,
8 Cal. 3d 855, 863-64 n.4, 506 P.2d 212, 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393-94 n.4 (1973).
0 280 U.S. at 123-24.
7 Neu's opening brief on appeal stated, inter alia, that:
Factors, such as the great lengths of time that have passed since that deci-
sion and the very limited extent of the Supreme Court's analysis, made for
disposal of the case, which is a relic that cannot stand in the way of contem-
porary understanding of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
as provided in such cases as . . . [citations omitted]. Indeed Silver, as the
only real obstacle to invalidation, is a weak basis on which to found equal
protection.
548 F.2d at 284.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751,
518 P.2d 362 (1974); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist., 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975);
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W. 2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195,
331 N.E. 2d 723 (1975).
n, See, e.g., Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justice v.
Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W. 2d 687 (Iowa 1974);
Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W. 2d 86 (S.D. 1975).
13 Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, dismissing appeal from 520 P.2d 883 (Utah),
rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974).
1, See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
75 429 U.S. 945 (1976), denying cert. to 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.). The Seventh Circuit
was convinced that the Indiana guest statute was unconstitutional but, based on Cannon
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dissenters expressed regret that "a statute [the Indiana guest
statute] whose constitutionality is patently open to serious de-
bate""6 had to be upheld, and would have granted the petition for
certiorari "so that [they might] give plenary consideration to the
constitutional issue that hasstirred such conflict among state and
lower federal courts.'""
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit felt compelled to follow
Silver, and "[tihus, Neu's federal constitutional challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion [were] foreclosed. 78 The Neu opinion once again points out
some of the strong arguments which can be made against Silver,
and at least hints that we have not heard the last of the conflict
surrounding the constitutionality of guest statutes.
VI. DUE PROCESS: SOCIAL SECURITY
In McGrath v. Weinberger,7 the Tenth Circuit held that due
process does not require that prior notice and an opportunity for
a hearing be afforded Social Security beneficiaries who are deter-
mined to be incapable of managing their benefits.
McGrath's sister was appointed to serve as representative
payee for his Social Security benefits after he was released from
a mental hospital and a determination made by the Social Secu-
rity Administration that he was incapable of managing his bene-
fits. In a class action suit, McGrath claimed that certain Social
Security provisions" were unconstitutional because they violated
the due process clause by allowing the appointment of a repre-
sentative payee without affording the beneficiary prior notice and
an opportunity to contest the determination that the beneficiary
is incapable of managing his own benefits.
The trial court applied a balancing-of-interests standard of
review and concluded that prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard were not required by the due process clause because the
and Hicks, felt required to affirm the district court which had applied the statute to grant
summary judgment to the driver of an automobile. 536 F.2d at 1159-60.
" 429 U.S. at 950 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 548 F.2d at 285.
71 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The provisions challenged were 42 U.S.C. § 405() (1976) and 20 C.F.R. 404.1601,
(1970) both of which govern the authority and procedures of the Social Security Adminis-
tration to make a beneficiary's payments to a representative payee.
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denial of McGrath's right to manage his own benefits was not
such a grievous loss that it outweighed the governmental interest
involved.8 1 McGrath appealed, contending that the trial court
erred in using the balancing-of-interests standard of review.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding and
stated that the issue was settled by Mathews v. Eldridge,"2 a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, where the
balancing-of-interests test was recognized as the appropriate
standard of review for due process claims."
In weighing the competing interests of the parties, the Tenth
Circuit found the government's interest substantial since oral
hearings in capability-determination matters would involve con-
siderable time and expense. The court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the governmental interest outweighed McGrath's
loss of the right to manage his own benefits. Underlying the
court's application of the balancing-of-interests test were the
facts that there are procedures available for reviewing such a
determination and that the Social Security Administration modi-
At 541 F.2d at 253.
424 U.S. 319 (1976). In light of Eldridge, the Tenth Circuit in McGrath stated that
it would be unwarranted for it to hold that due process requires prior notice and an
opportunity for a hearing where there has been no termination of benefits. 541 F.2d at 253.
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's distinction in Eldridge between sub-
stance and process. The Supreme Court held that Eldridge's substantive claim to a pre-
deprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right must fail since he could obtain full
relief at a post-deprivation hearing. In regard to the procedural issue of jurisdiction,
however, the Supreme Court recognized that the termination of Eldridge's benefits did
satisfy the requirements of finality sufficiently to constitute a final decision reviewable
by the Court. Id. at 331 n.il.
9 The Supreme Court stated in Eldridge that due process generally requires the
consideration of three factors:
[Fjirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
It is well recognized that the balancing-of-interests test is the appropriate standard
of review in procedural due process claims. See generally Comment, Irrebuttable Pre-
sumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J.
1173, 1176 (1974). Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) are examples of the Supreme Court's application of procedural due process
balancing by which the Court weighs governmental interests such as administrative effi-
ciency and economy against the importance of the interest asserted by the individual.
VOL. 55
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
fied its procedures subsequent to the filing of this suit to require
a ten-day notice of a proposed payee action.
VII. COLOR OF STATE LAW
The issue of acting under color of state law came before the
Tenth Circuit twice during 1977. In Taylor v. Nichols8' the court
of appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the defendants
in the section 1983 action were all either immune from civil suit
or had not been acting under color of state law. Taylor involved
a civil rights action, brought by police officer Brian Taylor, which
grew out of the apprehension and detention of Michael Allen.
When Allen refused to get in the police car, Officer Taylor put
Allen in by force. A subsequent police internal affairs investiga-
tion exonerated Officer Taylor, but Michael Allen's mother filed
criminal assault and battery charges against the officer. Allen's
attorney, Latimer, was later appointed special prosecutor after
the county attorney refused to file criminal charges against Offi-
cer Taylor. Latimer prosecuted the assault and battery charges
against Officer Taylor under his special appointment by the
county attorney and three county commissioners. Officer Taylor
was acquitted of the criminal charges and subsequently brought
the instant section 198386 civil rights action against everyone in-
volved in his assault trial. The district court granted a summary
judgment for all the defendants.
The court of appeals considered whether the district court
erred in dismissing the claims against all the defendants. One by
one the defendants were held to have been either immune or
acting under color of state law, the vital ingredient necessary to
support a section 1983 civil rights action. Michael Allen and his
father were held not to have acted under color of state law be-
cause their acts of filing a claim and testifying at the trial did not
constitute state action.87 Latimer, the special prosecutor, was
held to be immune from a civil suit for damages under section
1983. The court, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,u declined to draw
a distinction between a special prosecutor and an official prosecu-
- 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977).
BId.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
' Filing a claim and testifying at trial are private acts. Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875
(7th Cir. 1975).
- 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
1978
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tor, stating that Latimer was entitled to the same protection as
the permanent prosecutor. 8 The judge in the assault case was
"unquestionably entitled to absolute immunity.""0 The county
commissioners' involvement entitled them to qualified immunity
absent a showing by plaintiff that they had acted in a manner
which disqualified them from claiming immunity."
In upholding the district court's ruling for the defendants,
the court of appeals additionally declared that plaintiff Taylor's
other allegations under sections 1985 and 1986 must fail because
he "failed to make even a minimal showing that he was denied
equal protection or equal privileges and immunities guaranteed
by federal law .... ""
The Tenth Circuit decided in Mondragon v. Tenoriol3 that
there had been no state involvement in the leasing of the common
lands of a New Mexico land grant to bring the leasing under color
of state law. The action, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 urged
that appellants, inhabitants of Anton Chico land grant, were dis-
criminated against in the leasing of common lands in a com-
munity land grant originally made in 1822. The defendants were
members of the Board of Trustees of Anton Chico Land Grant
who were authorized under New Mexico statutes" to issue leases
of the common lands. The grant of powers to the trustees included
the power to control and manage the land grant.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the trus-
tees were acting under color of state law in leasing the common
lands in an allegedly discriminatory manner. The district court
concluded that there was no such color of state law and the court
of appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the state stat-
ute was the limit of the state involvement in the grant and that
its scope was narrow. No governmental functions were contem-
plated by the statute nor was there any ongoing relationship 7
0 558 F.2d at 566.
oId.
558 F.2d at 567.
2 558 F.2d at 568.
554 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-1 (1953).
" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-1 (1953).
* See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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which would bring the actions of the trustees under color of state
law. The Tenth Circuit further concluded there was no legislative
ratification of the acts of the trustees and that there was "shown
no state action and no state involvement in a private entity""
which would bring it under color of state law.
VIII. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In Los Alamos School Board v. Wugalter" the Los Alamos,
New Mexico, School Board challenged the constitutionality of
subsection 19(G) of the New Mexico Public School Finance ActN
on the ground that it conflicted with the federal Atomic Energy
Community Act (AECA) of 1955.101 Defendants were the New
Mexico state education officials who administer funds to the state
school districts. Because Los Alamos received education funds
under the AECA, it received state education funds expressly
under subsection 19(G) of the School Finance Act.' °0 The School
Finance Act provided that Los Alamos would come under the
general school funding formula only if received no AECA funds
in a given year. This provision resulted in less state education
funding for Los Alamos and thus "Los Alamos [was] singled out
for special treatment merely because it [received] AECA
funds."'' 3 Los Alamos did not contend that New Mexico had de-
nied it equal protection by virtue of the special statutory treat-
ment but instead contended that subsection 18(G) was unconsti-
tutional under the supremacy clause'1 because it conflicted with
the federal Atomic Energy Community Act.105
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the intent of
Congress was to prohibit New Mexico from funding Los Alamos
schools in a different manner solely because they received federal
funds under AECA. Indicating that supremacy challenges must
be decided on a case-by-case basis,'"0 the court of appeals went
" 554 F.2d 423, 426 (10th Cir. 1977).
" 557 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1977).
' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(F) (1953). The challenged subsection is now codified
as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(G) (Supp. 1975) and is referred to as subsection 19(G) in
text.
101 42 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2394 (1970).
,02 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-6-19(G) (Supp. 1975).
'° 557 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1977).
' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
IU 42 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2394 (1970).
'o 557 F.2d at 712.
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through a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction
of the two statutes and then reaching and determining the consti-
tutional question of whether they are in conflict. Because the New
Mexico statute had not been construed authoritatively, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the district court's description of the Public
School Finance Act as an "equalization formula designed to elim-
inate adverse education effects caused by disparities in financial
resources available to individual school districts."'07 The AECA
authorized funds for assistance in operating atomic energy com-
munities with the purpose of providing for the "maintenance of
conditions which will not impede the recruitment and retention
of personnel essential to the atomic energy program."'' 8 There
was no showing that New Mexico's school district funding level
impeded the recruitment or retention of essential personnel in the
community of Los Alamos. In justifying its reversal of the district
court, the court of appeals noted first that "school finance laws
should be entitled to respect"'09 and second that they had been
directed to no evidence of any congressional "intent to limit the
manner in which states give education aid to atomic energy com-
munities . . . ."10 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that since
subsection 19(G) did not frustrate the effectiveness of the AECA,






557 F.2d at 713.
42 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1970).
"' 557 F.2d at 715 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
11 557 F.2d at 715.
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